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Abstract
EU officials and government authorities are considering that structural funds may represent the instrument by which EU Member
States can recover from the present crisis. However, theoretical evidence suggests that the absorption capacity of any country is
also affected by economic downturns. Using Romania as a case study, we will attempt to solve this peculiar dilemma by analyzing
three factors which are paramount for the absorption of structural funds, respectively: the macroeconomic and financial capacity,
the administrative efficiency and people’s uncertainty regarding the European funding system. Preliminary results seem to confirm
that a country’s capacity to spend the allocated money is also crippled by economic depressions.
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1. Introduction
The current economic crisis has determined policymakers to search for methods to create jobs and boost economic
growth. For many politicians, especially those in comparatively poorer countries, structural funds offered by the EU
appear as the long searched for panacea. However, trying to exit an economic crisis by using structural funds implies
somewhat of a logical paradox. The absorption capacity of any country is also influenced by these macroeconomic
phenomena. The national factors which influence the ability to spend the allocated EU money (also known as
absorption determinants) are correspondingly affected by general economic fluctuations.
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We will group Romania’s determinants of absorption under three main categories: macroeconomic and financial
capacity, administrative efficiency and individual’s uncertainty regarding the European funding system. Economic
theory and empirical evidence suggest that all of these magnitudes were considerably crippled by the current economic
downturn. It is no coincidence that between 2007 and 2013 Romania had the worst absorption rate in the European
Union (European Commission, 2013). Again, it is no coincidence that most of the European Member States incurred
similar low percentages of paid expenditures during the same time period (European Commission, 2013).
Both practitioners and researchers (Zaman & Georgescu, 2009; Berica, 2011; Boldea, 2012) talk about a seemingly
paradox of absorption. They claim that this paradox refers to the fact that it is the most disadvantaged nations that
experience the greatest difficulties in absorbing structural funds (Katsarova, 2013). However, we argue that the real
paradox consists in the attempt to use structural funds as the means of exiting an economic crisis. This type of popular
rational contains in it the seeds of circularity. Even if the European funds would be efficiently used and would actually
generate healthy economic growth – and there are numerous voices that argued that this is not the case (Boldrin &
Canova, 2001; ECORYS, 2006) – the factors which determine the absorption rate are themselves hit by the economic
crises.
The methodology used for the elaboration of the present study consisted mainly in verbal logic and the interpretation
of statistical data. Because this field of study has a somewhat qualitative character, we consider that economic analysis
based on a priori reasoning is the best fit approach for such a task. In order to illustrate our findings, we have also
made use of different statistical data collected both from national and international sources.
2. Literature review
It is a well-known fact that EU’s Cohesion policy aims at reducing economic and social disparities between the
different regions involved. The means by which this goal can be supposedly reached are the Structural Funds. Given
their impressive amount (being second in rank only to the Common Agricultural Policy) their impact has been
analyzed from several different perspectives. Whether it was their ability to stimulate economic growth and regional
development (Martin, 1997; Cappellen et all, 2003; Sapir, 2003; Ederveen et all, 2006), their added value (Bachtler
& Taylor, 2003) or the effects they have on the business environment (Midelfart-Knarvik & Overman, 2002),
structural funds have always been in the spotlight of all European debates.
In the past few years, due to the economic crisis, more and more voices have considered structural funds to be the
“cure” for the economic downturn. The European Commission emphasized on several occasions the important role
that these funds could play in the economic recovery of Member States, since their main objective is to eliminate
economic disparities between regions (European Commission, 2009). Other economists have also supported this idea
(Jiletcovici, 2010; Smail, 2010).
In these conditions, spending the money allocated through structural funds was placed at the top of the list of most
national governments. In order to boost the absorption rate, European institutions implemented a set of measures
(Healy & Bristow, 2013; Katsarova, 2013). Among them, we can mention the adoption of regulations providing
temporary increases of the EU co-financing rates for those Member States that were severely affected by the economic
crisis and the modification of the n+2 rule for Romania and Slovakia (Katsarova, 2013).
However, even if we assume that structural funds could actually generate growth, one question still arises: can a
country increase its absorption rate in difficult economic periods or is this absorption capacity itself influenced by
economic crisis? There are several studies focused on the factors which determine Romania’s capacity to spend EU
funds, both at European (Katsarova, 2013; Healy & Bristow, 2013) and national level (Zaman & Georgescu, 2009;
Berica, 2011; Zaman & Cristea, 2011; Boldea, 2012;). Most of these studies aim at making policy recommendations
in order to increase the absorption coefficient. The determinants identified and analyzed vary from study to study,
some of the most commonly cited being: bureaucracy and corruption, the national capacity to co-finance projects,
macroeconomic indicators (GDP, inflation, exchange rates, etc.) and uncertainty felt by the business environment
which deters companies from applying for European financing. Although experts disagree on policy recommendation,
there seems to be a consensus related to the fact that bad economic periods do have an impact on a country’s absorption
capacity.
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Given the wide range of determinants, we chose to focus on three of them: the macroeconomic and financial
capacity, the administrative efficiency and people’s uncertainty regarding the European funding system. Our choice
was also motivated by the fact that the same categories were tackled by the European institutions (Katsarova, 2013).
3. The factors determining Romania’s capacity to spend structural funds
The absorption capacity can be defined as a country’s ability to spend in an efficient and effective manner the
structural funds that were allocated to it (Katsarova, 2013). The absorption rate, on the other hand, is being calculated
according formula:
Equation (1): Absorption rate = total money spent and reimbursed / total money allocated x 100
The academic environment linked this phenomenon to three types of capacities that should exist at national level:
macroeconomic capacity, financial capacity and administrative capacity (Zaman & Georgescu, 2009; Berica, 2011).
However, we consider that it is more useful to analyze the first two under the same category because the capacity of
any one country to co-finance its projects depends on macroeconomic variables like GDP, government revenues,
inflation, exchange rates and government deficits. Also, we consider that a third determinant must be included – i.e.
private individuals faith in the European funding system. People can become skeptical as to whether the payments
they made in the course of their projects are going to be reimbursed. Once uncertainty steps in, small and medium size
companies can start considering structural funds less attractive based on fear of bankruptcy.
Although our study concentrates on Romania’s example, we consider that the results can be practically applied to
any European Member State. We will show that all three of the previously mentioned determinants are affected by
economic crises, crippling a country’s capacity to absorb structural funds.
3.1 Macroeconomic and financial capacity
A country’s ability to attract structural funds depends on its macroeconomic variables, each of them influencing
the absorption rate in a different way. Among these variables, the most important one is probably government revenue,
because a country requires resources to co-finance its European investment projects. We will discuss below a few
macroeconomic indicators which have a direct influence on Romania’s absorption rate and show that in the 2007-
2013 period, all of these indicators were affected by the economic crisis.
The first and most obvious indicator is the country’s GDP. It is a well-known fact that EU administrative rules
limited the transfer of funds to a maximum of 3.8 per cent of the countries’ GDP in the period 2007-2013 (Katsarova,
2013). This means that the amount of allocated funds varies in direct proportion with this macroeconomic variable.
However, in times of economic crises, a countries’ GDP growth usually decreases or can even become negative.
This implies that the country’s maximum amount of funds allocated also diminishes in times of crises. But this is
not all. Government revenue will also decrease relatively to GDP, which translates into the fact that there will be
comparatively fewer resources to finance European projects. This phenomenon will be usually reinforced given that
when economic downturns occur, governments tend to have increased problems collecting taxes. Bad economic
periods push numerous individuals which can no longer operate efficiently towards “black markets” (Dicoi, 2012).
On top of this, there is still one more macroeconomic tendency which will hinder the absorption rate, and that is the
fact that whenever economic depressions appear, government expenses, especially those connected to welfare
spending, increase.
Table 1: Macroeconomic indicators for Romania
Subject Descriptor Units 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Gross domestic product,
constant prices
Percent
change 6.317 7.349 -6.576 -1.149 2.158 0.689 1.997
Inflation, average
consumer prices
Percent
change 4.837 7.849 5.587 6.095 5.785 3.336 4.515
Unemployment rate Percent oftotal labor 6.413 5.788 6.859 7.277 7.400 7.038 7.130
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force
General government
revenue
National
currency
(billions)
134.173 165.549 156.373 168.635 181.567 193.148 209.406
General government total
expenditure
National
currency
(billions)
147.141 190.407 192.782 202.256 205.277 207.921 224.106
Source: (IMF, 2013)
Romania’s situation in the 2007-2013 period is a text-book case study. As we pointed out earlier, Romania had
the worst absorption rate in the EU in that specific period. Can this be attributed to chance? We argue that if one looks
at the statistics, this scenario would have been predictable. As Tabel 1 indicates, between 2007 and 2013 Romania
was heavily affected by the economic crisis. After the inflationary boom in 2007 and 2008, economic growth dropped
to -6.6 per cent of GDP in 2009 and -1.1 per cent in 2010. It is clear that this decrease in the national GDP affected
Romania’s capacity to co-finance European projects. But there is an even more interesting phenomenon at work. We
can see from Table 1 that government revenues over the period in question increased slower than government expenses
did. In 2009 there was actually an absolute drop in government revenue from approximately 165 to 156 billion Lei.
All these data suggest that the co-financing process was hindered by the economic crisis, which in turn affected the
absorption capacity at a national and regional level.
Other important macroeconomic variables which can have an impact on a country’s capacity to absorb European
funds are unemployment and inflation. If unemployment is high, it means that fewer people are willing and able to
implement investment projects, on the one hand, and that the state will spend more money on welfare, on the other.
Furthermore, a high unemployment rate could underline the inefficiency of structural funding programs aimed at
reducing unemployment, especially through life-long learning and through professional reconversion courses. As we
can see, Romania had an unusually high unemployment rate reaching over 7 per cent since 2010 onwards.
Inflation can also play its part in the absorption equation. All the loan contracts are signed in the national currency
while some of the goods intended for purchase have prices expressed in Euros (Berica, 2011). A depreciation in the
national currency as compared to the Euro could create problems regarding the implementation of the projects.
Romania’s inflation rate was rather high in the analyzed period, reaching 7.8 per cent in 2008 and then being
maintained at around 6 per cent in the following years.
The last indicator which we will analyze in this section is a rather unusual one. Although it has an indirect effect
on the country’s capacity to absorb European funds, we argue that its effects are considerable indeed. This indicator
is the commercial bank’s lending interest rate. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the lending interest rate in Romania,
which is calculated as a national average of the interest rates charged by private banks when offering short and medium
term credits. It is a well-known fact that numerous small and medium size companies (but also some public
institutions) do not have sufficient resources in order to provide the necessary cash flow for the projects (Zaman &
Cristea, 2011). Therefore they go to the banks hoping that they may obtain the resources necessary until the payments
are finally reimbursed.
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Figure 1: The evolution of the lending interest rate in Romania
Source: (World Bank Group, 2013)
However, economic theory informs us that business fluctuations are caused by bank credit expansion (Strigl, 1934;
Mises, 1953; Hayek, 2008). The same theory explains that the beginning of the crisis is market by an increase in the
interest rate, which signals the fact that the available resources which were previously saved are insufficient in order
to fund all the investment projects which were undertaken. We can see the same scenario in Romania. The highest
interest rate was registered in 2009, when the GDP decreased by a rate of 6.6 percent. But if banks are increasingly
reluctant to offer credits to untrustworthy companies, this will also affect the absorption of EU funds. The beneficiaries
will find it increasingly complicated to obtain the cash needed to implement the projects.
3.2 Administrative efficiency
The second determinant of absorption which we will analyze is the administrative efficiency. There are two key
aspects worth mentioning regarding this determinant, those being the degree of bureaucracy and the level of
corruption. The absorption of structural funds depends on the capacity of national agencies to be efficient in their
tasks. However, during any economic crisis, bureaucracy usually tends to get thicker (by adding red tape) while
corruption frequently increases.
Before going further on this issue, we would like to shortly describe the European funding system. When speaking
about structural funds, one must never forget their purpose and their corresponding methodology. They are the
instruments through which the objectives of the Cohesion Policy are achieved. In other words, they represent
redistributive tools, aimed at financing projects that wouldn’t have otherwise appeared on the market. This was clearly
stated in a report drawn up for the European Commission (Sapir, 2003): “Additionality criteria are meant to avoid the
risk of crowding out local investments and to ensure that cohesion policy finances investments that otherwise would
not have been undertaken”. Thus, from an economic point of view, they finance projects that wouldn’t have been
profitable to entrepreneurs on the market, by redistributing financial resources from the EU budget. The objectives of
the Structural Funds are established in an administrative manner at EU level, while at national level, the development
objectives and the operational programs, through which the structural funds are spent, are also elaborated by
bureaucrats.
Now, it is clear that the whole machinery of EU funding rests on the efficiency and good faith of public servants,
both at national and at European level. But both of these attributes seem to be affected in bad economic times. In
Romania’s case, corruption seems to have increased during the crisis period, as the following quote from the National
Integrity System Assessment states (Transparency International Romania, 2011):
“[…] the financial and economic crisis generated even more vulnerabilities to a country constantly situated among
the last two or three European countries in the Corruption Perception Index, with less than 4 points until 2010 on a
scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is a captive state and 10 is an entirely free of corruption state”.
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According to the cited study, Romania had a score of 53.8 with regard to the control of corruption, while the
government efficiency aggregated by the Worldwide Governance Indicators had the lowest score in the European
Union, of only 51%. Furthermore, as Table 2 shows, the wastefulness of government spending, as well as the
favoritism in decisions of government officials, occupy ranks that should be a cause for concern.
Table 2: Indicators related to the effects of corruption in Romania
Source: (Transparency International Romania, 2011)
Of course, there is a possibility that these figures are overstated and it is also useful to keep in mind that variables
like corruption and bureaucracy are rather hard to quantify. We do consider however that it is highly probable that a
worsening of the economic climate can lead to a surge in red tape and unethical practices at government level. The
empirical data cited above seems to reinforce our argument.
3.3 People’s uncertainty regarding the European funding system
In the previous subsections we have discussed the effects that economic crises generally have on macroeconomic
indicators, bureaucracy and corruption. The last determinant that we shall analyze is the uncertainty felt by
businessmen to apply for EU funding. Few experts have taken this factor into consideration when analyzing the
determinants of absorption. However, it seems clear that the private sector’s reluctance to apply for funding does have
an impact on the absorption rate. This is the main reason why we chose to study this last factor.
 Entrepreneurship is based on taking risks and being rewarded for this, so businessmen are used to operate in
uncertain conditions. However, they normally base their actions on profit and loss accounting. This is the typical
mental tool of the market economy which is used by entrepreneurs to forecast events in an uncertain environment
(Mises, 1949). Nevertheless, decisions relating to structural funds are different from this point of view, because they
have to take into consideration politico-administrative actions and not market prices.
We are fully aware of the scientific difference between risk and uncertainty (Nelson & Katzenstein, 2011).
However, we consider that it is somewhat immaterial for the present study. When we use the term uncertainty we refer
to the lack of trust (uneasiness) that entrepreneurs feel when they consider applying for EU funding. We do not believe
that this subjective feeling can be quantified or that a numerical probability can be associated to these actions.
There are three main types of factors that influence this general level of uncertainty felt by the private sector
involved in European funded projects: the climate of legislative inconsistency (Transparency International, 2011),
delays in the reimbursement of incurred expenses and the projects’ approval process. Each of them is like an alarm
which signals businessmen to stay away from structural funds and consider productive market oriented projects.
Empirical data collected regarding the Romanian economy seem to confirm these arguments. For example,
Transparency International Romania (2011, p. 20) stated that “the climate of legislative inconsistency discourages
investment and seriously affects substantial business and European projects”. Even though this climate is generated
mostly by the questionable adoption of laws, rules and regulations, it is clear that the economic crisis affected this
process, since between 2007 and 2013 most of the important legislative acts have been passed without the vote of the
Parliament.
Although the legislative climate indicator can be criticized as being too general, there is another phenomenon which
targets beneficiaries of Structural Funds specifically. In the case of projects which were already accepted, uncertainty
appears first of all due to the slowness of the bureaucratic process of reimbursing the incurred expenses. In some
cases, firms contracted credits in order to be able to cover the required co-financing and at some point were forced to
declare bankruptcy because the reimbursements were not paid in time. For example, the representatives of the
Indicator Value Rank / 142
Intellectual property protection 3.0 98
Public trust of politicians 1.9 119
Favoritism in decisions of government officials 2.5 115
Wastefulness of government spending 2.7 107
Ethical behavior of firms 3.4 103
Transparency of government policy making 2.9 140
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Businessmen Association of Romania are claiming that companies which have been operating for several years are
now on the verge of bankruptcy because the payments were delayed (Belcean, 2012; Olescu, 2012) and that the
member companies will never use Structural funds again (Olescu, 2012). Thus, the business environment is now quite
reticent in applying for European funded projects, since they cannot rely on the sums from the reimbursements in their
economic calculations.
Another source of uncertainty for the private sector lies in the project preparation, submission and approval phase.
Most companies will incur costs with the elaboration of projects (e.g. hiring consultant companies; using existing
human and material resources for the elaboration of projects etc.), but the approval of the projects is not guaranteed
(Zaman & Cristea, 2011). For example, in the Sectorial Operation Program - Human Resources Development
(POSDRU), the rate of success for the approval of projects in Romania was around 29% in 2012. This means that out
of the total number of submitted projects, less than a third was approved and have already entered the implementation
phase (AM POSDRU, 2012). In these conditions, it is normal for people to become more skeptical and question these
rather cumbersome selection processes which lack the much needed transparency.
All these facts add up and increase the uneasiness felt by the private sector related to the implementation of projects
financed from structural funds, which in turn leads to a reduction of the number of possible beneficiaries (and
implicitly of the sums that could be absorbed at national level).
4 The absorption paradox reconsidered
When experts and practitioners talk about the absorption paradox they usually have in mind that the countries that
have the most urgent need of structural funds also manifest an inability to attract and spend them (Zaman & Georgescu,
2009; Boldea, 2012; Katsarova, 2013). However, what we have attempted to point out in the present article is that the
real paradox consists in the attempt to use structural funds for exiting an economic depression.
Business cycles also affect the capacity of a Member State to absorb EU funds. As we have seen, the three main
absorption determinants, respectively the macroeconomic and financial capacity, the administrative efficiency and the
general public’s uncertainty regarding the European funding system, are severely crippled in bad economic periods.
Shortly put, whenever a depression hits a certain country it is highly probable that the GDP will decrease, corruption
and bureaucracy will surge while people’s confidence in the EU funding system will generally deteriorate.
As economists, it is extremely hard to argue that structural funds generate economic growth and that EU
redistributive schemes will bring about an optimal allocation of resources (and we have no intention of doing that).
On the contrary, from an economic point of view, the market is the most efficient mechanism of allocating resources
(Mises, 1949). What we do want to underline is that structural funds cannot be used by Member States to recover from
the present crisis because economic downturns cripple a country’s capacity to absorb those resources. Such an
argument is rather inconsistent from a logical point of view.
5 Conclusions
After briefly describing structural funds and their effects on the national economy, we have shown that these
financial instruments cannot be used in order to exit the present crisis, because the absorption capacity of a country is
also crippled by economic downturns.
The factors which determine the rate of absorption can be grouped under three main categories, respectively:
macroeconomic and financial capacity, administrative efficiency and individuals’ uncertainty regarding the European
funding system. First of all, an economic crisis will have a tendency to decrease government revenue while increasing
expenditures, leaving fewer resources available to co-finance European projects. Unemployment, monetary instability
and scarcity of credit will reinforce this tendency.
Regarding the efficiency of public officials, which is paramount for the good execution of European funding
schemes, it is extremely probable that additional red tape and corruption practices will result as a consequence of the
economic crisis. At the same time, private entrepreneurs who use structural funds will become more skeptical
regarding the system. They will start questioning the selection process and will become weary about future delays in
reimbursements.
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Romania’s situation can be used as a text-book example. The deteriorating macroeconomic environment, the
increasing corruption practices and the lack of trust of the private sector in using structural funds can explain why
Romania had the worst absorption rate in the European Union between 2007 and 2013. However, we consider that the
study has a rather general character and that the results can be applied to all Member States. If the European funding
schemes maintain their current form, bad economic periods will have a negative effect on a country’s absorption
capacity.
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